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Abstract 
Climate change has been identified as a key challenge for our modern society. Economic growth and societal welfare 
has always been associated with increasing energy consumption and environmental pollution. However, the key 
question to be answered is how much of our money we would like to invest in a better environment. The most cost-
effective solution to combat climate change would be to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases where this could be 
done at lowest cost. However there is no real driver to reduce emissions for an individual, unless there is a legal 
requirement or a cost associated to the release of CO2. Neither option will work if it is applied only at national or 
regional scale. At a European and Member State level, numerous policies are in place designed to incentivise carbon 
reductions to facilitate the introduction of low carbon technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). In 
Europe, the financial support for CCS demonstration via the EEPR and the NER-300 initiatives gave an expectation 
of the construction of 10-12 demonstration plants in Europe. The hope that these projects can be successfully 
deployed has been significantly declining in line with falling CO2 certificate prices. Near term stalling of CCS 
deployment in Europe, including technology readiness (e.g. up-scaling, by-products, emissions, aquifer storage); 
economics (CAPEX, OPEX), liabilities (e.g. probability, value, guarantees); and public and political acceptance is a 
likely future development. Different support mechanisms need to be applied for technology development, technology 
introduction and technology deployment, taking into account local conditions and interactions between different 
instruments. In particular all measures for technology deployment should enable a level playing field for CCS and 
other carbon reduction options. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change has become a widely accepted challenge for the future growth and welfare on our 
mother earth. Since the first IPCC Assessment report in 1990 [1], climate change has become apparent 
and the clear necessity for action has been pinpointed. Increasing greenhouse gas emissions from human 
activities, ranging from power generation through industrial processes such as cement and steel 
production as well as impacts from deforestation and clearance by fire have been translated to a 
significant increase of the concentration of green house gases in the atmosphere. Fig 1.shows 
development of the atmospheric CO2 concentration measured at the Maua Loa Observatory, showing a 
clear and continuing increase of atmospheric CO2 concentration since the beginning of the measurements  
 
Fig. 1. Atmospheric CO2 concentrations at Mauna Loa 
1.1. Measurers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
There are a number of different possibilities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the future, the most 
obvious being energy efficiency and increased used of renewable energies, cf. Fig. 2. However none of 
the possible technology options to reduce emissions can be seen as a silver bullet and a broad mix of 
measures will be necessary to achieve the required reductions. All types of measures will come with 
individual potentials, costs and possible speed of implementation, so careful analyses and understanding 
of possible repercussions and interdependence have to be taken into account. 
Politicians worldwide are trying to address these challenges by defining appropriate energy policies, at 
regional or national scale. These range from market driven approaches such as the European Emissions 
Trading System ETS, incentives-driven options such as feed in tariffs, direct taxation of CO2 emissions  
or approaches driven by the development of standards. Most countries are trying to develop a mix of 
different policies to achieve the energy policy targets; taking into account that one instrument 
implemented will require additional measures at a later time 
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Fig. 2. IEA Blue Map Scenario to reach 2050 Emission reduction targets [2] 
1.2. The role of CCS for climate change mitigation 
As can be seen from the ‘blue-map’ scenario of the IEA in Fig. 2, CCS is expected to contribute an 
overall of 21% of the required emission reduction by 2050, with half of it to be realized in industry and 
the other half in the power sector. Calculations made by the IEA showed that in scenarios without CCS, 
the total cost to halve CO2 emissions levels by 2050 would increase by 70%. Therefore, the successful 
implementation of CCS in the future will be key to ensure an affordable energy supply by achieving the 
challenging emission reduction targets at minimal cost. It is clear that affordable energy is not simply a 
target in itself but instead it will guarantee economic growth and welfare for the world’s increasing 
population. 
However, CCS is an innovation to decarbonise fossil power generation in an early phase of 
development with, currently,  a significant number of pilot plants up and running to test the technology in 
the power sector. So a key question is from which point in time the technology is needed and what does 
this mean for the required development path? Given the scenarios of the IEA, CCS must be fully 
deployed in 2050 and therefore people might tend to the conclusion that CCS is too early for the market 
as it is neither required nor adequately rewarded at the moment. The next section therefore looks at the 
challenges and opportunities to enable CCS to play a role in our future energy system  
2. Challenges and Opportunities for CCS Demo projects 
During the last 10 years, CCS pilot plants have been set up and operated to gain the necessary insight 
into the technology and its challenges. This is reflected in a significantly increasing number of scientific 
journal papers and a broad range of conferences related to the topic with an increasing number of 
participants during this time. In 2009, when Europe encountered economic difficulties, the EU 
Commission started the European Economic Program for Recovery (EEPR), offering a total of more than 
1 Billion Euros for 6 CCS Demo projects to be developed after the implementation of the EU Directive 
on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide [3]. In the following sections, different aspects of 
importance to driving forward demonstration projects are discussed. 
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2.1. Regulation 
The EU CCS Directive provided the legal framework for the storage of CO2 in the EU. However, to be 
applicable in the different Member States (MS), the EU directive needs to be transposed into national law. 
Member States have 2 years for this realization but only Spain transposed the directive in the required 
time, and the Commission started infringement procedures to the MS not having transposed the directive. 
By the beginning of 2012, fortunately most MS with demonstration projects under way had implemented 
the CCS directive. However, due to the delays in transposition in Germany, the Jänschwalde 
demonstration project was cancelled at the end of 2011.  
From the 6 EEPR projects, only the draft storage permit of the ROAD project in the Netherlands has 
been submitted to the EU for comment, and this was finally evaluated positively by the Commission on 
28 February, 2012. No other storage permit has been submitted for review to the Commission, showing 
the difficulties and delays with storage sites. The legal status report of the IEA [4] analyses in more detail 
the different challenges world-wide, including the OSPAR and London Convention which have been 
amended for CCS but with the amendment not yet ratified. 
Project developers are facing, in addition, the challenge that there remain significant uncertainties 
regarding the liabilities and the handover processes and requirements after the CO2 storage phase has 
been completed. A critical issue with the liabilities is linkage to the ETS Directive, so that for every tonne 
of CO2 which might leak an emission certificate has to be surrendered. Whereas the technical risk of the 
tonnage of CO2 which might leak out can be quantified, it is much more difficult to quantify the 
certificate price at the moment the CO2 might leak, which can be in 30 or 50 years time as this price is 
determined politically by climate policy in Europe. 
It should also be noted, that –as it stands now - capturing and storing CO2 from biomass-fuelled CCS 
will not lead to any benefit from the ETS, as biomass installations are currently treated as CO2 neutral and 
therefore have no advantage under the legislation if they reduce avoid their CO2 emissions through 
capture and storage. 
2.2. Economics and Financing 
As with most environmental technologies, cleaning up power plants or industrial installations by CCS 
will require additional investments for equipment and will increase the operational costs of the plants. 
There have been a number of studies undertaken trying to quantify these costs and their impact on the 
power price [5]. For commercial deployment of CCS, these costs need to be recovered from the market to 
make it attractive for investors to apply CCS. At the beginning of a learning curve, introduction of new 
technologies needs financial support from public sources as the additional costs and risks cannot be 
recovered from the market. Therefore support schemes such as the European EEPR program and the 
NER-300 support for CCS demonstration projects are necessary but not sufficient to make the project 
work. Additional national support by capital grants and/or feed in tariffs will most likely be necessary to 
bring demo projects to a positive investment decision. The cost for adding CCS at demonstration plant 
scale of 250 MWel will typically be in the range of 500-1000 Million Euros, with EEPR and NER-300 
providing a maximum funding of 180 and 337.5 million Euros limited to 50 % of the total costs, 
respectively. In times of economic recession with a reduced need for power, investment in new power 
generation capacity is typically delayed and the willingness to invest in loss making projects with an 
uncertain future is hugely reduced. So additional support from MS, by tariff incentives or other additional 
revenue streams such as the sale of CO2 for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) are necessary to make 
projects happen. 
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When the CCS demonstration projects started planning in 2008, companies (and indeed, legislators 
and regulators) were expecting a further rise of certificate prices in the near future, giving a sound 
optimism that the savings in CO2 certificates will be able to compensate for the additional costs of CCS 
after the demonstration phase, therefore opening a business perspective for the technology. Certificate 
prices of 25 Euros per tonne of CO2 had been a common assumption and went into the economic 
calculations of the project proponents. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the certificate prices have, however, 
declined since then and now languish at a price of around 7.5 Euros per tonne. Since, for a 250 MW CCS 
facility, the total emission to be captured is around 1 Million Tons of CO2 per year, the drop in the 
certificate price produces an additional financial gap of about 20 Million Euros per year for the operator. 
At a price level of 7.5 Euro per certificate, the operational costs of the CCS chain is more expensive than 
the potential savings, so each hour of additional operation will lead to additional losses. 
 
Fig. 3. CO2 Spot price over time 
It should be noted that all demo projects in Europe are faced by the same economic challenges. The 
Zero Emission Platform has therefore developed a report on what could be done to improve this situation 
[6]. Without additional European or National support, the demanding CCS demo program of the EU, 
having 8-12 demo projects running in 2015, will fail. In the worst case, no CCS demo project might be 
realized. This would most likely harm the further development of CCS in Europe for a long time. 
2.3. Public Support 
Different technologies to mitigate climate change are perceived quite differently by the general public. 
With renewable energies having the highest support rate in general, even if public opposition against 
wind farms onshore or the public debate on biomass derived fuels also show increasing difficulties for 
them. In western societies, all large scale infrastructure projects from motorways, airports and pipelines to 
train stations or train lines are heavily debated. A key challenge with all infrastructure projects is the fact, 
that advantages and disadvantages for any individual need to be balanced with the advantages and 
disadvantages for the society. Carbon capture and storage as a new technology has still to explain and to 
prove its merits to the public, requiring the testing and application of the technology at demo scale. 
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CCS can easily be attacked as green-washing for fossil fuels or by raising fears about the 
explosiveness of the gas (a wrong but often made statement) or by linking disastrous natural releases of 
CO2 to technical storage. The difficulty lies with the challenge of proving general statements where it is, 
for example, easily said that a storage site could leak but difficult to prove a 100% leak free site upfront. 
As with all types of technologies, there is always a remaining risk for each technology, however this can 
and should be brought close to zero.  
 
All this has caused severe delays for demo projects planning to store CO2 onshore. E.g. gaining public 
support for onshore storage in Germany was impossible, leading to a stop of the Hürth IGCC project with 
CCS. So a first logical step might be to start with CO2 storage offshore to further prove the safety of 
storage. It is worth noting that, to date, the running demo projects related to oil and gas production such 
as the Sleipner project have already stored more than 10 Million tonnes of CO2. Whereas people do not 
object too much to the capture part of the chain, the transport infrastructure and CO2 storage are 
questioned in many parts of Europe. There is still a strong belief in the general public, also supported by a 
number of politicians, that the electricity supply can be shifted completely to fluctuating renewable 
energies and therefore CCS might not be necessary. However people tend to ignore the fact that 
electricity from renewables together with the necessary reinforced grids and energy storage will be more 
costly than allowing CCS in the electricity mix. Looking on the first order effects, the additional costs for 
a single household seem to be affordable, but often the second order effect is overlooked. European 
industry has to compete internationally and significantly higher electricity prices will reduce the 
competitiveness of the industry, which is the key driver for economic growth and jobs in Europe. 
Therefore job loss in Europe due to high electricity prices will play a much more important role than the 
individual increase of the electricity bill per household. 
 
So far, regulatory focus has largely been on emission reduction from power generation. However CCS 
is has a much broader application than the power sector alone. Industrial process emissions (e.g. steel, 
cement, lime, and fertilizer) cannot be displaced by switching to a supply of renewable energy; they will 
still emit a significant amount of CO2. Industry has been reluctant so far to address CCS to a larger extent 
as long as the application of CCS is not rewarded by the market, but it will most likely be key to getting a 
broader support for CCS in Europe. 
2.4. Technology 
Improvement of the technology is necessary to bring down the capital and operational costs for CCS. 
Since the early developments, significant progress has already been made, bringing down the energy 
penalty from 17%-point to values of around 8%-points. It is expected that significant further learning 
effects can be realized, based on the experience from demo projects and further R&D [7]. However better 
understanding of the technology based on a significant number of pilot plants in operation and research 
done at universities, it is also clear that new issues have been appearing, such as the emissions of solvents 
and degradation products with the decarbonised flue gas. Technological challenges typically trigger new 
solutions. Compared to barriers from regulation, economics and public acceptance, technological barriers 
can be addressed and solved by technology providers or technology adopters, whereas the others require 
the engagement of a much broader number of stakeholders with diverse interests, making the resolution 
much more complex and time consuming. 
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3. The Innovation Cycle applied for CCS 
The concept of Innovation Cycles is aimed at understanding the different phases an invention has to go 
through before it can be declared as a success, cf. Fig. 4. This concept can be applied to all types of 
inventions and is not limited to CCS. In 2007 a study [8] tried to systematically understand the process 
and possible indicators for the different innovation phases. The most critical point in the process is 
between phases 3 and 4, when disillusionment triggered by lower expectations or challenges larger than 
expected are encountered and the new orientation has not yet been successfully leading to a new rise of 
activities and prospects.  
It should be noted that the disillusionment is not only due to new issues with the technology 
development, e.g. possible solvent emissions from post combustion plants, but to a much stronger reason 
linked to the business perspectives of the technology. As CCS is actually predominantly linked to fossil 
power generation a darkening perspective for new power projects in Europe due to economic recession 
and significantly rising renewable capacities reduces also the prospects for CCS. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Model of the innovation cycle 
The question if it is too early or too late for CCS cannot easily be answered. Most actors in CCS still 
believe that CCS is a necessary technology to combat climate change and to enable the achievement of 
the emission reduction targets until 2050. A new orientation for CCS can be to move to new options such 
as capturing CO2 emissions from industrial plants first or by using the CO2 for enhanced oil recovery 
(EOR) applications or as feed stock for other industrial products such as plastics (polycarbonates). 
It is important to keep a minimum level of activities to prepare for the future rise, as it takes normally a 
number of years to build up capacities in development, engineering, procurement, manufacturing and 
operation of such large scale systems. 
 
The European Commission introduced its EEPR and NER-300 support programs when the technology 
was in innovation phase 2 and this has led to a significant increase of activities to develop and deploy 
CCS. At this time, some stakeholders felt that the technology was already in phase 5, ready for the start 
for large scale deployment, even if a number of actors had warned that the program should be less 
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ambitious and optimal plant sizes for the demonstration program should better be 100 MWel than 250 
MWel, which would have reduced significantly the investment and operational cost of the plants without 
reducing the potential learning. It could be argued that it was too early for CCS to enter in the deployment 
phase of the technology. If the technology can make a turnaround to bridge the ‘valley of death’ this 
could lead to a resurgence in a number of years. Otherwise the technology might disappear from further 
discussions.  
4. From Project Studies to Project Implementation 
Looking at the current status of demo projects can therefore help to identify what needs to be done on 
the short and medium term to overcome the actual challenges. For the further development of CCS it will 
be crucial to bring at least some demo projects to financial close and hence engineering reality to enable a 
relevant level of activities to be held at utilities, suppliers and governments. Urgent action is needed to 
bundle forces to achieve and retain the necessary minimum critical mass to stay prepared for the future. 
4.1. The status of  EEPR Demo projects in Europe 
The European Commission made funding available for 6 demo projects in Europe at the end of 2009, 
aiming at having the demo projects in operation in 2015 at the latest. Towards the end of 2011 one of the 
six demo project was terminated by the owner, who saw no chance of bringing the project to financial 
close. It appears, from the information available to the authors of this paper, that the 5 other projects are 
all challenged, albeit to differing extents. Certainly none of them have reached the final decision point of 
financial closure and taken a financial investment decision. Table 1 gives the authors’ perceived 
overview on the advancement of the projects based on different criteria. As can be seen from our 
evaluation, we expect only 2 projects to have a chance of achieving a financial investment decision in the 
near term and only the ROAD project appears ready to take a financial investment decision if financial 
close can be achieved. As projects can typically not remain idle for an indefinite time, there is, in 
addition, a severe risk that projects which are ready for financial investment decision but cannot be 
brought to financial close will be cancelled, even if all other conditions would be ready for the decision.  
 
If Europe wants to get forward with at least one or two demo projects, then immediate action will be 
necessary to enable the ROAD and the Don Valley projects to close the open gaps. Financial closure will 
be the most challenging one, as economics of projects have been seriously worsened due to the weak CO2 
certificate price. Shifting or reallocating the unspent money from the cancelled demonstration projects to 
the promising ones could be an important step to make this happen. However, to make this possible, a 
broad coalition of European Commission, European Parliament, MS and industrial companies would be 
necessary but this seems to be difficult or even unlikely. The Don Valley and ROAD projects have 
indicated their openness for additional partners and all interested partners could play a role, however in 
the past there seemed to be no interest of other oil, gas or power companies to share the expected 
substantial loss against substantial learning’s and to make these projects happen to drive CCS 
development in Europe. Acknowledging the recent changes for other demo projects and the overall 
framework, the Don Valley and ROAD project have restarted to look for additional partners being willing 
to team up. 
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Table 1. Readiness for final investment decision of the EEPR projects (own analysis) 
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Don Valley 
(UK) 
      
Belchatow 
(PL) 
      
ROAD (NL)       
Compostilla 
(ES) 
      
Porto Tolle 
(IT) 
      
Jänschwalde 
(DE) 
Project was cancelled by project owner at the end of 2011. The CCS Directive was not 
implemented in Germany at this point in time 
 
4.2. The status of NER-300 Projects in Europe 
The hope for a second wave of CCS demo projects triggered by the NER-300 funding mechanism is 
now also reaching the finalization of its first round of call for proposals with award decisions by the 
Commission expected before the end of 2012. At the end of last year the ZEP Task Force Demo and 
Implementation undertook an anonymous survey across the demonstration projects in Europe [9]. 13 out 
of 14 European demonstration projects participated in the survey. Fig.5 shows the results of the survey 
regarding the share of funding which is required, based on the assumption of the project managers. About 
80% of them believe that a funding ratio about 50 % will be required for FID. 
Fig. 5: How much funding is necessary for FID [ZEP, 2011] 
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Asked what they would see as the key challenges for their projects to achieve FID, most managers 
pointed to the current ETS price level, the negative NPV of the projects and the storage site qualification, 
cf. Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Key challenges for FID [ZEP, 2011] 
In July, the EC published the results of the due diligence [10] of the applicant projects and is waiting 
for confirmation of co-funding for the projects by the MS until middle of October 2012. As can be seen 
from the ranking list (Table 2), the two highest ranked projects on this list have already received EEPR 
funding, but especially the Belchatow project might not be able to fulfill the required start up date of the 
plant four years after the NER award decision, as the onshore storage site appears unlikely to be ready in 
time.  
Table 2. Readiness for FID of the NER-300 projects ([10], own additions) 
Project Name Project Promotor Ranking 
Positions 
Received 
EEPR funding 
Don Valley (UK) 2CO 1 Yes 
Belchatow (PL) PGE 2 Yes 
Green Hydrogen (NL) Air Liquide 3  
Teeside CCS (UK) Progressive Energy 4  
UK Oxy CCS (UK) Alstom, Drax Power, National Grid 5  
C.GEN North Killingholme (UK) C.Gen 6  
Porto Tolle (IT) ENEL 7 Yes 
Ulcos BF, Florange (FR) Arcelor 8  
Getica (RO) CE Turceni, Transgaz, Romgaz 9  
Peterhead (UK) Shell 10  
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The Green Hydrogen project in Rotterdam harbor close to the ROAD project is planning to jointly use 
infrastructure with the ROAD project; a failed FID for ROAD would therefore also impact the Green 
Hydrogen project which could in this case most likely be cancelled as well. As the funding available for 
CCS under the NER-300 program will be most likely between 750 and 900 Million Euro and a maximum 
funding per project of 337.5 Million Euro, only two power and one industry project (with lower funding 
requirement due to lower total amount of capture) can be awarded based on available funds. Just recently, 
Arcelor Mittal announced the definite closure of steel production at its Florange site [11]. Therefore the 
only candidate for capture from industry in the NER-300 competition remains the Green Hydrogen 
project. 
 
As a larger number of projects on the NER-300 candidate lists are UK based, it will be important 
which projects will get the backing of the UK Government. The key challenge for the UK is that they 
have to align their 1000 Million GBP demo project funding with the process at EU level. However the EU 
and the UK are using different evaluation criteria for the projects. The EU is using the cost per tonne of 
CO2 as their benchmark, whereas the UK is using the cost per clean Megawatt-hour. Whereas the first 
give gas projects such as the Peterhead project no realistic chance compared to coal fired plants, they can 
compete well on the clean Megawatt-hour. .A modus operandi is required by which the two parties can 
reach a common, or at least mutually acceptable, basis of assessment in order to maximize the likelihood 
and usefulness of the resultant demonstrations. .  
4.3. The necessary steps to be taken 
So, to summarize, the initial euphoria to have up to 12 CCS demo projects up and running in 2015 has 
not become reality, as delays for setting up the legal framework and providing the funding mechanisms, 
(albeit both of these were done quite quickly at the European level), has taken too much time. If both had 
already been in place in 2009, it is much more likely that project owners would have taken FID. 
The end of 2012 will be a critical milestone for the future of the EU CCS demonstration program. 
When the award decision for the NER-300 had been taken and a possible way forward for a reallocation 
of remaining funds might have been identified, Europe still has the chance to see two to three demo 
projects taking FID. Clearly this will not be a surefire success but needs a quick and intelligent co-
operation of the EU, MS and industry. Additional funding will be a key factor for overcoming the valley 
of death for CCS, as the prospects for CCS on the mid and long term are not assured in the currently 
climate policy framework. The recession in Europe together with a significant increase in renewable 
electricity production triggered by subsidies has undermined the Emission Trading System. Without a 
level playing field for all low carbon technologies it will be however difficult to achieve the solution at 
lowest cost. 
 
Fig. 7 shows a highly simplified comparison of different electricity generation technologies. The 
calculation is based on a typical spot market price for electricity except for wind and PV, where the feed 
in tariffs in Germany are used. As can be seen, none of the fossil technologies, either with or without 
CCS, will be able to recover their full costs in the market, with combined cycle plants making less loss 
than open cycle plants due to higher efficiencies and coal plants performing better that gas plants due to 
lower fuel costs. Clearly plants which cannot recover their full costs on the market will not be built, 
however existing ones will be operated as long as revenues are higher than operating costs. The cost for 
electricity from PV and offshore wind is clearly more expensive than the fossil alternatives with or 
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without CCS. Due to the high and secured revenue stream from the feed in tariffs, however these higher 
generating costs are more than overcompensated by the higher revenue streams. 
 
It becomes therefore obvious, that it is not only the high costs for CCS but especially the revenue side 
which disadvantage fossil power generation compared to renewables and therefore weakening the mid 
term outlook for CCS unless additional mechanisms are identified to address the short-fall e.g. contract 
for differences allocated for ‘de-carbonised’ fossil power – a proposal under advanced discussion in the 
UK. 
 
Fig. 7: (a) Economics of electricity generation technologies a) OCGT, b) CCGT, c) Coal, d) coal with CCS, e) Wind offshore; f) 
Solar PV. 
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5. Conclusions 
When the EU and industry initially thought that CCS should be deployed it was, in reality, still too 
early for CCS, as neither the legal framework nor the technology nor the funding was in place to allow 
the technology to develop and rise into the electricity market. During the last five years, significant 
progress has been made in terms of all possible aspects, however the overall outlook has been darkened 
and the initial euphoria has receded.  
 
Nevertheless careful analyses and joint progress is necessary to ensure, that reorientation will not come 
too late and that CCS technology will remain a possible and cost effective option to decarbonize our 
electricity system at low cost. All recent studies and roadmaps have proven the importance of CCS, even 
if not fully recognized by the general public. It is therefore important to ensure that CCS can keep its 
momentum to deliver from 2020 onwards. Therefore at least 2 or 3 demonstration projects have to be 
realized in Europe still during this decade. 
 
 
References 
[1] IPCC First Assessment Report (FAR), IPPC geneve, 1990. Online: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_first_assessment_1990_wg1.shtml 
[2] Energy Technology Perspectives. Scenarios & Strategies to 2050, IEA, Paris, 2010. 
[3]: Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon 
dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 
2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006. Official JournaloftheEuropeanUnion, L 140/114, 
5.6.2009 
[4]: Carbon Capture and Storage. Legal and Regulatory Review, Edition 3. IEA, Paris, July 2012 
[5]: The Costs of CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage. Zero Emission Platform, Brussels, 2011. Online: 
http://www.zeroemissionsplatform.eu/library/publication/165-zep-cost-report-summary.html 
[6]: CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS) Creating a secure environment for investment in Europe. Zero Emission Platform, 
Brussels, 2012. Online: http://www.zeroemissionsplatform.eu/news/news/1476-ccs-creating-a-secure-environment-for-investment-
in-europe.html. 
[7]: Potential cost reductions in CCS in the power sector. Mot Mac Donald for DECC, May 2012. Online: 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/ccs/5237-potential-cost-reductions-in-ccs-in-the-power-sect.pdf 
[8] Bradke, H., et.al.: Developing an assessment framework to improve the efficiency of R&D and the market diffusion of 
energy technologies EduaR&D, Fraunhofer-Institut für System- und Innovationsforschung -ISI-, Karlsruhe, Germany. 2007.  
[9]: Challenges and Blockers on the Way to FID for European CCS Demonstration Projects. ZEP Task Force D&I, Bussels, 
November 2011. 
 [10]: NER300 - Moving towards a low carbon economy and boosting innovation, growth and employment across the EU. 
European Commission. SWD(2012) 224 final, Brussel, 12.07.2012. Online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/2012071201_swd_ner300.pdf 
 [11]: ArcelorMittal Atlantique and Lorraine announces intention to permanently close the liquid phase in Florange. Arcelor 
Press release, 01.10.2012. Online: http://www.arcelormittal.com/corp/news-and-media/press-releases/2012/oct/01-10-2012 
 
